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How to Keep our Youth away from IS: The Need for Narrative
Analysis and Strategy
Abstract
The German war theorist Carl von Clausewitz pointed out that in order to defeat an
[1]

opponent one had to crush his point of gravitation (Schwerpunkt). In the case of nonstate opponents, like the Islamic State, which do occupy territory, but more or less in a
nomadic way, moving like a snake among the rocks, it is difficult to target a physical point
of gravitation. In fact their Schwerpunkt is their ideological narrative, which functions as a
redoubtable pull-factor, responsible for attracting throngs of foreign fighters. So far the
West has shown a poor record in targeting this narrative. This paper tries to map some of
the elements in IS’s Schwerpunkt that look vulnerable and may be targeted in order to
diminish the power of the Islamic State as much as possible without actually fighting the
self-proclaimed Caliphate.
[1]

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/VomKriege1832/TOC.htm.
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Introduction
The German war theorist Carl von Clausewitz pointed out that in order to defeat an
opponent one had to crush his point of gravitation (Schwerpunkt).1 In the case of
non-state opponents, like the Islamic State, which do occupy territory, but more or
less in a nomadic way, moving like a snake among the rocks, it is difficult to target a
physical point of gravitation. In fact their Schwerpunkt is their ideological narrative,
which functions as a redoubtable pull-factor, responsible for attracting throngs of
foreign fighters. So far the West has shown a poor record in targeting this narrative.
This paper tries to map some of the elements in IS’s Schwerpunkt that look
vulnerable and may be targeted in order to diminish the power of the Islamic State as
much as possible without actually fighting the self-proclaimed Caliphate.
First, the difficulties of subduing IS and its lure to Western foreign fighters will be
discussed. Then the general tenets of the IS narrative will be pointed out and finally
the target points for strategic communications will be presented.
A Tough Opponent
Time and again it happens that terrorist attacks take place in North America or
Western Europe or that jihadists escape to travel to Syria or Iraq, forcing intelligence
and security authorities to admit that they had the culprits under surveillance, but
just not at the moment.2 The sheer number of (potential) jihadists and terrorists
makes it impossible to keep them under surveillance all the time, unless the country
would be turned into a police state. So far military actions against the Islamic State
have shown mixed results and while the Caliphate may be rolled back in Syria and
Iraq, it is projecting its influence into other areas in North and West Africa and South
and Southeast Asia. All it shows is that it is not possible to bomb or arrest an idea
from the surface of the earth.
The idea in this case is generally called by the names of Islamism and Wahhabism.
The first major proponent of this idea challenging the West with terrorist onslaught
was al-Qaeda, headed by Usama bin Laden and after his death in 2011 by his
successor Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Qaeda was guided by the ideas of the Egyptian
Islamist Sayyid al-Qutb (1906-1966). Qutb as so many Islamists wanted to establish
the rule of Sharia and to do so the Islamists would have to eliminate the influence of
the West in the Muslim world and with it their “apostate” accomplices who rule the
countries in the Muslim world. Qutb’s ideas were very helpful in creating opposition
against the Arab rulers, but less so in establishing a new Caliphate, because the
central tenet of his philosophy was that no Muslim could rule over the other. The

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/VomKriege1832/TOC.htm .
Ed Pilkingon and Miriam Elder, “FBI Faces Questions over Previous Contact with Boston Bombing
Suspect”, The Guardian, April 21, 2013, available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/21/boston-marathon-bombings-fbi-tsarnaev;
Nancy Dillon, “Charlie Hebdo Attack Plotters were Well-Known by French Authorities, Spotted with
Al Qaeda Recruiter in 2010,” New York Daily News, January 13, 2015, available at:
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/charlie-hebdo-attackers-spotted-al-qaeda-recruiterarticle-1.2076562.
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idea of a Muslim ruler was therefore an oxymoron to him.3 And thus, though Qutbadept Usama bin Laden championed the idea of establishing a Caliphate, he
remained stuck in his own rhetoric. When the choice was between awe-inspiring
terrorist attacks and the possibility to have an emirate or caliphate Usama bin Laden
chose the former. He first and foremost promoted an idea, al-Qaeda, which could be
used as a brandname by organizations in Africa and Asia, as long as they professed
some loyalty to the core of al-Qaeda.4
One of these affiliates, al-Qaeda in Iraq, which had earned its experience mainly by
fighting American troops and Shiites in Iraq, developed into a different direction.
One of its early leaders, al-Zarqawi, took a different view on Islamic rule than his
mentors. His idea was actually quite the opposite. Wherever two Muslims are united,
his teachings go, one will be the emir.5 Such an idea suited actual rule much better
than the philosophy of Qutb had. Zarqawi’s deviation from Qutb’s central tenet
meant that the movement needed territory to establish its rule. In the more or less
civil war that developed after the American liberation of Iraq from Saddam Hussein,
ethnic and religious cleansing went hand-in-glove with the establishment of the
beginnings of a new Caliphate. After 2010 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi walked in the
footsteps of the deceased al-Zarqawi as leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. He used the civil
war in Syria to establish a branch of his organization in the neigboring country. In
the summer of 2014 he surprised the world by taking the city of Mosul and
proclaiming a Caliphate that had the dimensions of a middle-size country, albeit a
state in flux. This Caliphate attracted thousands of foreign fighters, many more than
any jihadist conflict before. Soon the Caliphate started receiving pledges of allegiance
from other parts of Africa and Asia, where Islamist movements were trying to
establish territorial rule.
This being the case it becomes nigh impossible to eradicate the violent Islamist
movement physically from the face of the earth. Kinetic and law enforcement
measures in and by themselves do not suffice. The only promising weapons seem to
be words, as even former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged
recently: “You begin to look at this thing not like a war, but more like the Cold War …
you’re not going to win this with bullets, you’re in a competition of ideas.”6 However,
so far a war of words against al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and their like have not
shown much success. It is not difficult to find utterances claiming that in so far as
there is a public relations campaign going on, the Islamists are winning thanks to a
sophisticated media strategy.7 This is quite different from the time of the Cold War,
De Graaff, Bob, Op weg naar Armageddon: de evolutie van fanatisme (Amsterdam: Boom, 2012),
503-515.
4 Ibid, 564-565; Scott Stewart, “The Jihadist Trap of Here and Now,” Stratfor Global Intelligence,
June 25, 2015, available at: https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/jihadist-trap-here-and-now.
5 Napoleoni, Loretta, Terreurlegende Al-Zarqawi (Amsterdam/Antwerpen: De Arbeiderspers 2006),
71.
6 “Donald Rumsfeld: George W. Bush Was Wrong About Iraq,” Bloomberg Politics, June 8, 2015,
available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-06-08/donald-rumsfeld-george-wbush-was-wrong-about-iraq.
7 Stern, Jessica and J.M. Berger, ISIS. The State of Terror (New York: Harper Collins, 2015), 244, 249;
Roach, Alfred S.,Why Is The United States Losing The War Of Words In The Global War On Terror?
Identifying Causes Of Failure In U.S. Communication Strategy (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, School of
Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2010); Bill Gertz, “Report:
Islamic State Winning Propaganda War Against U.S.,” Free Beacon, June 24, 2015, available at:
3
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when the West used the superiority of democracy over dictatorship and the
preeminence of capitalism over communism to its advantage in its wars of words.
The Lure of Apocalypse
The radicalized narrative8 of IS, which mobilizes and energizes support, is centered
around several themes, including Muslim victimhood, a sense of belonging to a
global Muslim community (Ummah), brutal winner’s messaging by IS combatants,
IS being the final utopia of an unadulterated Islam, to which all humiliated and
suffering Muslims should flock to in order to take part in the great Day of Judgment.9
Thus IS distinguishes itself from al-Qaeda, being an inviting inclusive society for
Sunni Muslims under threat instead of the terrorist vanguard that al-Qaeda was.
One of the elements that makes IS’s narrative so potent is this appeal to apocalyptic
senses, which urges foreign fighters to come to the Caliphate by proclaiming the
message “do not miss the boat.” One of the central tenets of apocalyptic narratives is
an appeal to feelings of injustice. The apocalyptic story holds the promise that at the
end of times the first shall be the last and the last shall be the first. Feelings of
discrimination and inferiority abound both in the Islamic world and among Muslims
in the West. The idea of getting on top of things in the midst of a world historical
process has a strong appeal for those who feel a need for counter-humiliation in
which both personal and broader social and political feelings coincide. We know
from earlier apocalyptic movements that an apocalyptic glee over the fate of former
elites is a highly attractive incentive to join.10 This notion makes it clear that the
condemnation of maybe the most obvious part of IS, i.e. its abhorrent violent acts
against its opponents, may not be very helpful in convincing people not to join this
movement.
Neither will defeat and drawbacks immediately diminish the attractiveness of the
Caliphate as such negative developments can easily be explained as lessons Allah is
teaching his true followers to become even more ardent in their religious zeal. In a
similar vein, any resistance can be explained as a vindication of IS’s own beliefs that
the eschatological battle between the true Muslims and the forces of the Muslim
Antichrist, Dajjal, are beginning. Thus, as with any other apocalyptic belief, IS’s
belief system is a form of self-fulfilling paranoia. Another non-starter upon which
non-Muslim politicians quite often enter is to state that the Islamic State does not

http://freebeacon.com/national-security/report-islamic-state-winning-propaganda-war-againstu-s/; Bibi T. van Ginkel, “Responding to Cyber Jihad: Towards an Effective Counter Narrative,” 1 and
14, ICCT Research Paper, March 2015, available at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-vanGinkel-Responding-To-Cyber-Jihad-Towards-An-Effective-Counter-Narrative-March2015.pdf.
8 For the concept of “radicalized narrative” see Cobb, Sara, Speaking of Violence. The Politics and
Poetics of Narrative Dynamics in Conflict Resolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
9 Charlie Winter, “Islamic State Propaganda: Key Elements of the Group’s Messaging,” Terrorism
Monitor 12:13 (June 12, 2015), available at:
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44030&cHash=8e2
c776b9fa5b40119a8dfc05b5c3ebf#.VZ5-MZPtmko; Alex P. Schmid, “Challenging the Narrative of the
‘Islamic State,’” ICCT Research Paper, June 2015, available at: http://icct.nl/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/ICCT-Schmid-Challenging-the-Narrative-of-the-Islamic-StateJune2015.pdf.
10 Cf. De Graaff, Op weg naar Armageddon.
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represent the real Islam.11 In the Islamic world it is already difficult to decide upon
the real doctrine, let alone that non-Muslims claim to be authorities in this respect.
If we want to address especially the audience of those in the West who consider
joining we have to come up with other means and ideas. That is where the combined
roles of intelligence experts and educators come together. And that is why I think
IAFIE is a good platform to discuss such a narrative strategy. The foregoing also
demonstrates that it is necessary to first establish the lures of the IS narrative before
we can develop an alternative or counter-narrative. In this respect the debate with IS
differs from that with the communist empire of evil. Then we were preaching mainly
for the converted; this time we will have to address those who need convincing, the
ones that may or may not leave for the Caliphate and among whom an alternative or
counter-narrative can make a difference.
In a global village that in the end may be no one’s world, because no one’s values may
be accepted as self-evident,12 such an effort at convincing, such an operation of
influencing, may be an exercise that will not only pay off in the war against IS but will
also be the stepping stone for future information and influence operations, in which
the West has recently had to acknowledge the superiority of both IS and Putin’s
Russia.
Targeting Points
What are the weak points that could be exploited in the IS narrative? First of all as
the near-end-state IS should be more or less perfect from an Islamist point of view.
The fact that its area is controlled by “perfect” Muslims who have the blessing of
Allah should guarantee almost perfect rule. Anything that can be detracted from this
one-hundred percent will create doubts about the truthfulness of IS and its leaders.
IS also makes much of the special place allotted to women in the Caliphate. In its
gender orientation it is most obvious that the Caliphate is a paradise for just the
elected. Its claim to equality rings false in this respect and certainly women who have
lived all their lives in the West will recognize this.
The leadership of the Caliphate opines that it can decide who is a real Muslim and
who is a kafir. This dividing mechanism between us and them may turn out to be
even more divisive than intended. Each decision about identity is open for criticism
and doubt. The fact that the Caliphate does not unite Muslims but divides them may
make the idea of a salutary state crumble. Divisions within the Caliphate may be the
best way to disappoint those who came to live in a world free from the polarizations
they were used to between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Another targeting point will be the fact that in a Caliphate ruled by leaders who call
themselves Muslims they can no longer maintain that they are merely victims as they
Geoff Dyer, “Isis is not about Islam, says Obama,” The Financial Times, February, 19, 2015,
available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d2977822-b85c-11e4-b6a500144feab7de.html#axzz3eTU2bBZe; “Abbott Condemns Overseas Terror Attacks”, Sky News, June
27, 2015, available at: http://www.skynews.com.au/news/top-stories/2015/06/27/abbottcondemns-overseas-terror-attacks0.html.
12 Kupchan, Charles A., No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012).
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liked to do in order to attract people who were willing to defend them. They have
become perpetrators themselves. This would, by the way, be another argument for
the West to leave the Islamic State as much as possible alone, as any interference
could be explained as another form of Islamic victimization.
Hopeful Signs
Fortunately, after the attacks on the cartoonists of Charlie Hebdo in Paris some
Western governments decided to put greater efforts into counter-narratives. In
February, the US government decided to coordinate strategic communication and
public diplomacy policies in the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications at the State Department, which would expand and get its own
intelligence cell. In the same month the Five Eyes intelligence community decided to
develop counternarratives in order to refrain youths in the West from becoming
foreign fighters. In the same vein the coordinator for counterterrorism of the
European Union, Gilles de Kerchove, pleaded for the use of video clips to counter
radicalization processes. And just recently the anti-IS coalition launched the counterpropaganda Sawab Centre in Abu Dhabi.
The Role of Disillusioned Foreign Fighters
The best champions for such a counter-narrative will not be the authorities in the
West, just as a teacher or a police officer are not the most suitable persons to keep
youths from starting to use drugs or commit crime. We know from such examples
that a former drug addict or an ex-felon are all the more convincing. Therefore in the
war of words against Islamic State the persons most suited to propagate the message
are disillusioned jihadists who have returned to their countries of origin in the West.
These recanters are proof par excellence that the Islamic State is not as ideal as it
looked to some at first sight. They are the ones who came to the conclusion that there
is still a lot of injustice in the Caliphate or that crucifixions, stoning, beheadings and
slavery do not blend in with their wrong-headed ideas of romanticism.13 Intelligent
programs should be established in which they come to play a role as part of pay-back
system that will help them to reintegrate in their societies.
It will be very difficult to sell such a program to the public in Western states like the
Netherlands, where the mayor of Rotterdam literally told radicalized youths to “fuck
off,” where the prime minister said that he preferred Dutch foreign fighters to be
killed in the Middle East rather than see them return, and where a majority of the
population would like to see returnees locked up for as long as possible. It is to be
hoped that the promise of greater efficacy will in the end convince both the
authorities and the public at large that such an approach holds more promises than
any other policy to reduce the attractiveness of the Islamic State.

13

Elaine Gainley, “Former Guantánamo Detainee Steering Europe’s Youths away from Jihad,” Miami
Herald, June 7, 2015, available at: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/guantanamo/article23330670.html.
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